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On 8 May 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) celebrated the land mark milestone 
of the declaration of smallpox eradication exactly 40 years ago. The declaration marked the 
end of a disease that had plagued humanity for at least 3000 years, killing an estimated 300 
million people during the 20th century alone.1 As recently as 1967, the year in which 
eradication efforts were intensified, an estimated 2.7 million deaths were attributed to 
smallpox. 
Smallpox was eradicated thanks to a global effort that began in 1959 spearheaded by WHO, 
further intensified in 1967. It involved ten-thousands of health workers around the world 
who administered an estimated half a billion vaccinations. The cost of the intensified effort, 
led by WHO, was estimated to be 300 million USD in cash by global donors in addition to 
countries` contributions. Those investments were well spent as they now save the world far 
more than US$ 1 billion every year since 1980. Speaking at a virtual event hosted at WHO-
HQ to celebrate the 40 year anniversary of smallpox eradication, WHO Director-General Dr 
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said, “As the world confronts the COVID-19 pandemic, 
humanity’s victory over smallpox is a reminder of what is possible when nations come 
together to fight a common health threat.”2 
Some of the lessons learned from the eradication of smallpox could be essential in helping 
us now tackle the COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
What are the characteristics of smallpox? Smallpox is an acute febrile viral disease 
characterized by a distinct pustular-vesicular rash. The incubation time is approximately 12 
days.3 Transmission results from droplets expressed from the oral, nasal, or pharyngeal 
mucosa of an overtly ill patient that are inhaled by susceptible persons in close contact with 
the patient. Variola major, the only known variety until the end of the 19th century, resulted 
in case fatality rates of 30% or more, whilst Variola minor became the prevalent variety 
throughout the United States, parts of South America, Europe, and southern and eastern 
Africa from the 19th century onward, and has a case fatality of 1%. The impact of smallpox 
on human civilization cannot be overstated as it posed a risk to  the entire  world.  During 
the 18th century, five reigning European monarchs died of smallpox, and the Austrian 
Habsburg line of succession shifted four times in four generations because of smallpox.4  
 
Most estimates for the R0 (the average number of unvaccinated secondary cases infected by 
each primary case) of smallpox are between 3 and 6, similar or even higher to that currently 
estimated for SARS-CoV-2.5 It spread less widely and rapidly compared to diseases such as 
measles associated with an even higher reproduction number.6 Transmission of variola virus 
sometimes occurred 2-3 days after the onset of fever, but most times it occurred at a time 
when patients were already sick and unable to circulate widely. For this reason, smallpox 
outbreaks tended to be clustered in a segment of a town or village and in localized areas of 
a province or district. Transmission from persons who were still mobile when infectious 
occurred if they attended social events, such as the congregation of large numbers of 
people at festivals and weddings, or the seasonal movement of nomads. The incidence of 
smallpox was highest during winter and spring. High-risk groups were health care workers.  
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Countries had substantial expenditures to control smallpox, care for its victims and operate 
quarantine programs to prevent the importation of disease. 4  In 1967, India estimated the 
cost of smallpox at USD 722 million, of which 10 million USD was for vaccination, 12 million 
USD to care for sick patients, and 700 million USD indirect costs from loss of economic 
productivity from morbidity and mortality. In the United States, even in the absence of 
endemic disease by 1968, the estimated cost associated with smallpox protection was 150 
million USD due to the cost of vaccination and of death and disability associated with the 
vaccine, and 14 million USD for international traffic surveillance including costs related  to 
delays in clearance of vessels.4  Other countries, such as the United Kingdom and Germany, 
maintained special hospitals to be opened to admit patients when imported cases of 
smallpox occurred. 4   
 
Smallpox eradication 
Various processes including variolation were used to prevent smallpox, and in 1796 Jenner 
introduced the smallpox vaccine. As a result, the disease rapidly declined in most of the 
Western world. However, the vaccine was not equitably distributed throughout the world, 
and it was only when a global effort to eradicate smallpox began in 1967 that all countries 
had access to vaccine leading to the eradication of smallpox by 1980. Eradication required 
cooperation and support that was for long difficult to build. For instance, a plan to eradicate 
smallpox was launched by WHO in 1959. Those efforts were stymied by a lack of funds, 
vaccine access and cooperation from countries. A new effort was launched in 1967 under 
the umbrella of WHO: the Intensified Eradication Program. By this point, the disease had 
been eliminated in North America and Europe, but outbreaks still plagued parts of South 
America, Africa and Asia. A turning point came during the Cold War when the Soviet Union 
and the United States came together to help eliminate disease by coordinating on strategy, 
logistics and vaccine donations despite major geopolitical political tensions at the time.7 
These coordinating strategies included ramping up vaccine production and access in 
affected  countries, training health-care staff and developing clear public health messages 
so that people could better protect themselves and their communities. The effort also 
leveraged targeted techniques like “ring vaccination” whereby only those who had been in 
contact with an infected person were monitored and vaccinated, a technique also 
successfully now used during Ebola outbreaks.  During the early eradication efforts, mass 
vaccination campaigns aimed at reaching 80% or more of the population, as it was thought 
that a herd immunity level of 80% and above was necessary to stop transmission. Later, it 
transpired that surveillance combined with targeted vaccination of primary contacts for 
each case was equally effective at containing outbreaks. In fact, the special programs to 
detect and isolate cases, and contain outbreaks, called “surveillance and containment”, was 
thought to be one of the key components of smallpox eradication.4  It required an effective 
case detection and notification system and focused attention on measures to reduce 
incidence. One reason for its success is the fact that all infections were clinically expressed 
with the same characteristic distribution of rash; case detection was therefore relatively 
easy and diagnosis did not require laboratory confirmation. Therefore the visible 
characteristic rash enabled rapid isolation, contact tracing and vaccination of contacts. 
There were several generations of smallpox vaccines, all very efficacious but also with 
substantial safety concerns. One dose of vaccine provided long-lasting immunity. An added 
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advantage of the smallpox vaccine was its benefit even as post-exposure prophylaxis: due to 
the long incubation time of smallpox, the vaccine was effective in preventing illness or 
modifying its course even if given within four days after infection.7 With increasingly greater 
emphasis on surveillance-containment activities, endemic smallpox steadily receded. It was 
eliminated from 20 countries in Africa by 1979, from Brazil in 1971, and the entire African 
continent in 1975. The last naturally occurring case of smallpox developed less than 1 year 
after the originally projected 10 year target date, on October 26, 1977, in Somalia.4  Two 
further cases were a result of laboratory infection in England in 1978 and these two cases 
were the last known human infections.  
Learning from smallpox for COVID-19 
The smallpox eradication effort required widespread cooperation, said the Director-General 
on 8 May during the celebrations, and was a first-of-its-kind global effort. “Viruses do not 
respect nations or ideologies," he added. “Although a vaccine was crucial for ending 
smallpox, it was not enough on its own”.1 
Many of smallpox` characteristics are similar to COVID-19: high reproduction number, 
clustering effects with superspreading events, with social gatherings as amplifiers. Control 
of COVID-19 is however more challenging than that of smallpox because of some 
dissimilarities. Infections with SARS-CoV-2 are not all expressed in the same manner, and 
many infections result only in mild disease that resembles other respiratory infections – 
identification and diagnosis therefore requires laboratory testing and is not as rapid as for 
smallpox. Transmission can occur from pre-symptomatic or mildly symptomatic infections, 
and possibly from those that are asymptomatic, and therefore transmission is stealth-like.8 
Nevertheless, containment by maintaining a very low reproductive number was shown to 
be feasible in China and many other Asian countries with stringent public health measures9, 
in particular South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Vietnam.10  
 
By May 2020, the COVID-19 epicentres of fatal disease are now in the United States, Europe, 
Brazil and Russia. Although the global scientific community is accelerating the development 
of vaccines and therapeutics, there are diagnostic tests available to combat COVID-19, and 
the focus must be to increase access to these tests within countries despite health 
disparities11 and also to low and middle income countries. All countries need to use 
enhanced testing to identify cases, test contacts who are identified during contact tracing 
and become sick within the period of surveillance, and isolate all those who are infected. 
Such focused public health measures were also successful for smallpox. It all boils down to 
disease surveillance, prompt patient identification, diagnosis and isolation of all cases, 
contact tracing and surveillance  of contacts. The public health community needs to learn 
from history and needs to regain its ability to do shoe-leather public health. If we come 
together collectively and use the public health tools that we have at hand, enhanced by 
vaccination, we will be successful in containing COVID-19 despite geopolitical tensions, just 
as we were successful in eradicating smallpox despite the Cold War at the time. To this end, 
WHO is facilitating a Global Collaboration to Accelerate the Development, Production and 
Equitable Access to New COVID-19 diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines, called the “ ACT 
Accelerator”.   
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 “….that same solidarity that we had for smallpox,” said the Director-General, “is needed 
now more than ever to defeat COVID-19.”2 
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